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Abstract 
Objectivity in news reporting is one of the most widely discussed topics in journalism, and 
numbers of studies on bias in news have been conducted, but there is little agreement on how to 
define or measure news bias. Aiming to settle the theoretical and methodological disagreement, 
the author redefined news bias and applied a new methodology to detect the Russian government’s 
influence on ITAR-TASS during the Ukraine crisis. A longitudinal content analysis of over 35,000 
English-language newswires on the Ukraine crisis published by ITAR-TASS and Interfax clearly 
showed that ITAR-TASS’s framing of Ukraine was reflecting desirability of pivotal events in the 
crisis to the Russian government. This result reveals Russia’s strategic use of the state-owned news 
agency for international propaganda in its ‘hybrid war’, demonstrating the effectiveness of the new 
approach to news bias. 
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Measuring news bias: Russia’s official news agency ITAR-TASS’s coverage of the 
Ukraine crisis 
There is almost unanimous agreement on the importance of independent journalism among 
scholars of mass communication, and objectivity in news reporting is one of the most widely 
discussed topics in journalism (Barkho, 2013b; Donsbach & Klett, 1993; Maras, 2012). The 
independence of journalists is a precondition for objective news reporting (Barkho, 2013a). 
Importantly, journalistic independence provides objective, or unbiased, political information 
allowing for effective democracy, constrains the power of the mass media, and maintains the trust 
of the public in mass media (Maras, 2012). Further, biased news reporting leads to the 
marginalization of certain social groups, misperceptions of political agendas, and public 
disenchantment and cynicism (Brandenburg, 2005). Researchers have embarked on empirical 
studies of bias in news on elections (Brandenburg, 2005; Hopmann, de Vreese, & Albæk, 2011; 
Kahn & Kenney, 2002; Robinson & Sheehan, 1983), wars (Aday, 2010; Aday, Livingston, & 
Hebert, 2005; Dickson, 1994; Entman & Page, 1994; Pfau et al., 2004), and foreign countries 
(Chaudhary, 2001; Jones, 2008; Meyer, 1989; Miller, 2007), but  there is little agreement on how 
to define or  measure news bias.  
In the empirical studies, one school of thought defines the lack of objectivity in news as 
unbalanced coverage of different subjects (Brandenburg, 2005; Cushion, Lewis, & Groves, 2009; 
D’Alessio & Allen, 2000; Dominick, 1977; Hopmann, Aelst, & Legnante, 2012). Within this 
conception of news bias, researchers focus on the sheer number of articles and the length of airtime 
allocated to certain issues, events or actors. Other groups of researchers pay attention to tones of 
news reports, using metrics such as ‘positive-negative’ (Aday, 2010; Brandenburg, 2005; 
Hopmann et al., 2012; Pfau et al., 2004; e.g. Robinson & Sheehan, 1983), ‘favourable-
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unfavourable’ (e.g. Hofstetter, 1976) or ‘supportive-critical’ (Aday et al., 2005; Entman & Page, 
1994; Kleinnijenhuis, Van Hoof, Oegema, & De Ridder, 2007). In this approach, news reporting 
with predominantly positive or negative tones is considered to be biased. 
The definition of news bias must be operationalizable in empirical inquiries, but it should also 
be based on the theories of media effect. Agenda-setting theory suggests that the amount of news 
coverage allocated to certain issues, events or actors influences their perceived importance among 
audiences (“what to think about”) (Besova & Cooley, 2009; Hester & Gibson, 2003; McCombs, 
Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, & Rey, 1997; Salwen & Matera, 1992; Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004), but, 
if our primary interest is investigating the mass media’s role in shaping news audiences’ attitudes 
towards subjects (“how to think”), we must scrutinise the ways those subjects are represented in 
news reporting. According to the theory of second-level agenda-setting, or priming, news reporting 
focusing on negative or positive aspects of events, issues and actors has a significant impact on an 
audience’s attitude toward them (Entman, 1993; Hester & Gibson, 2003; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; 
McCombs et al., 1997). The concept of media framing, which is defined as “selecting and 
highlighting some faces of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote 
a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution” (Entman, 2004, p. 5), also establishes a link 
between news reporting and people’s understanding of public affairs.  
Selective media frames manifest as unbalanced tones of news stories, which become either 
positive or negative when they concern events, favourable or unfavourable when they concern 
opinions, or supportive or critical when they concern policy options. However, not all news stories 
with a predominantly positive or negative tone can be considered biased, because tone can be a 
simple reflection of  objective reality, i.e., tones of news reports will be profoundly negative when 
stories describe inherently negative events, such as natural disasters, armed conflicts or social 
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disruptions, as Stevenson (1984) correctly point out in negative representation of the under-
developed countries in foreign news. Also, tones become overwhelmingly supportive of the status-
quo when disagreement among political elites is absent (e.g., the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks), as 
Bennett’s (1990) index theory suggests. The reflection of objective reality in the tones of news 
reporting poses methodological challenges in measuring news bias. Entman (2007), who is 
agnostic regarding objective reality, has even proposed an approach to news bias focusing only on 
the balanced coverage of different aspects of events, issues or groups.1 
This methodological challenge has constrained how news bias has been defined and measured 
in earlier empirical studies. The adoption of concepts such as ‘balance’ and ‘fairness’ as proxies 
to objectivity has been a common practice among researchers, as well as regulators, because of the 
difficulty in measuring objectivity itself  (Maras, 2012). The Fairness Doctrine of the Federal 
Communication Commission, which required American broadcasters to produced ‘balanced’ news 
reporting on public agendas between 1949 and 1987, has strongly affected the concept of news 
bias in scholarly debates, but ‘balance’ in news reporting is not so obvious in countries where the 
political landscape is more complex and the simple 50-50 benchmark derived from the US two-
party system does not hold (Hopmann et al., 2012). Some researchers of European media have 
resorted to benchmarks constructed based on the number of seats political parties hold in 
legislatures (Brandenburg, 2005), but it seems unrealistic to expect equal coverage of political 
groups in polarized media systems where partisan journalism is the norm. As a result of this, 
empirical studies on news bias have concentrated in the United States. 
                                                        
1 Entman is still dependent on his own knowledge of objective reality in identifying which aspects are not covered by 
the news when applying this approach. 
MEASURING NEWS BIAS 6 
 
Aiming to facilitate empirical studies on news bias in complex media systems, I present a new 
approach to measuring news bias, taking Russia’s official news agency ITAR-TASS’s English-
language news coverage of the Ukraine crisis as an example. My case selection was motivated not 
only by the significance of the crisis in Europe to international politics, but also by the severity of 
the above mentioned methodological challenges; in this case, the challenges were made 
particularly severe by a rapidly changing situation on the ground and a lack of non-media 
benchmarks with which to assess balance in the news coverage. In my approach to news bias, I 
will conceptualize objectivity in news reporting as coverage of all possible newsworthy stories, 
and analyse ITAR-TASS’s news coverage in relation to Interfax’s broader news coverage. In this 
setting, Interfax serves as a benchmark unit, which helps us to measure bias in ITAR-TASS’s news 
reporting caused by the Russian government’s influence excluding the effects of the inherently 
positive or negative nature of the events on the ground. I estimated the amount of bias in ITAR-
TASS’s news reporting using longitudinal data, which I produced by content analysing all the 
news stories on Ukraine published by the two news agencies over an 16-month period starting 
from January, 2013. 
My statistical analysis of the longitudinal data will clearly show that ITAR-TASS’s framing 
of democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine systematically biased during the crisis corresponding to 
the desirability of the situation in Ukraine for the Russian regime. The main causes of bias were 
(1) highly critical comments made by Russian officials on Ukraine, which the news agency quotes 
very frequently, and (2) profoundly negative descriptions of events related to Ukraine by the news 
agency. However, ITAR-TASS’s news articles tend to present the Russian government’s views on 
Ukraine in an ‘objective’ style of writing, blurring the distinction between opinions and facts. The 
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systematic bias in ITAR-TASS’s news coverage of the Ukraine suggests the importance of ITAR-
TASS in Russia’s ‘hybird wars’, which utilizes non-military means to achieve military goals.  
Hypotheses 
ITAR-TASS is a prominent example of a state-owned news agency. Its roots can be traced 
back to the imperial era, when the first Russian news agency, the Russian Telegraph Agency 
(RTA), was created by the tsar in 1866. The operation of the first news agency was limited to 
domestic clients, but a more international agency, the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency, was 
established by the government in 1904 to overcome Russia’s dependence on the German news 
agency, Wolf, for the international distribution of news. After the 1917 October Bolshevik 
revolution, newspapers and magazines were obliged to publish information received from a new 
central news agency, ROSTA, which integrated all national and regional information agencies, 
and later became the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, known as TASS. This news agency 
was directly controlled by the state and often used for propaganda during the Soviet era. According 
to Vartanova and Frolova (2010, p. 264) “TASS was different from other international agencies in 
that it acted as a voice of the Soviet government which tended to speak to the peoples of the world 
through its official spokesmen”. TASS survived the collapse of the Soviet Union, and was 
subsequently renamed ITAR-TASS. 2  Today, it is the official news agency of the Russian 
Federation and owned and administered by the government, enjoying exclusive access to official 
information. 
                                                        
2 ITAR-TASS was renamed TASS in September 2014 again to emphasize its connection to the predecessor (TASS, 
n.d.). 
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The influence of the Russian government as the owner of the news agency alone might have 
caused bias in its news reporting of the Ukraine crisis, in which Russia has vested interests, but it 
is also important to note that the general level of press freedom and the journalistic culture in 
Russia is very different from in Western countries. The media system of Russia is chracterized as 
Polarized model, in which journalists practice partisan reporting, commercial news media 
experience frequent state interventions, and media figures are integrated into the elite political 
network (Dobek-Ostrowska & Smaele, 2010; Vartanova, 2011). This limited press freedom and 
partisan journalism in Russia is expected to increase the degree to which ITAR-TASS reflects the 
wishes of Russia’s political elites, and therefore I expect to find consistent patterns in the framing 
of mediated communication that promote the influence of Russia on Ukraine, which indicate an 
existence of bias in ITAR-TASS’s news caused by the Russian government’s influence3 In fact, 
Horvit (2006), in his research on news agencies’ framing of the debates around the US-led 
intervention into Iraq in 2003, found that 54% of the ITAR-TASS stories sourced Russian 
government officials, and 53% of the paragraphs in its stories were negative toward US policy. 
His finding predicts that the ITAR-TASS framing of the Ukraine crisis will reflect the desirability 
of pivotal events to the Russian government, and therefore I formulate my first two hypotheses as 
following: 
H1: ITAR-TASS’s framing of the Ukraine crisis will become more positive 
when the situation in Ukraine is desirable to the Russian government. 
                                                        
3 This statement was originally “consistent patterns in the framing of mediated communication that promote the 
influence of one side in conflicts over the use of government power” (Entman, 2010, p. 166).4 See Appendix 1 
(available at https://1drv.ms/w/s!AnEkIea2cHXz_DyTqh23A719azme) for more detailed timeline of the crisis. 
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H2: ITAR-TASS’s framing of the Ukraine crisis will become more negative 
when the situation in Ukraine is undesirable to the Russian government. 
Although the literature details theory largely based on studies of the news coverage of elections, 
wars or foreign countries by retail news media (such as newspapers or TV), I adopt this theoretical 
framework as a starting point, aiming to identify necessary changes for wholesale news media 
(news agencies). D’Alessio and Allen (2000) identified three types of bias in news reporting in 
their meta-analysis of election studies: ‘coverage bias’, ‘gatekeeping bias’ and ‘statement bias’. 
According to their definitions, coverage bias stems from unbalanced amounts of news coverage 
allocated to particular subjects; gatekeeping bias is a result of selection or deselection of particular 
kinds of stories; and statement bias is caused by inclusion of journalists’ opinions. Coverage bias 
is expected to increase the salience of a particular country for the international audience as 
concentrated media coverage has an agenda-setting effect; both gatekeeping and statement bias 
are likely to cause attitude changes among audiences, because the arbitrary selection of stories and 
insertion of opinions have a second-level agenda-setting effect. 
Considering ITAR-TASS’s status as an official news agency, I expect to find gatekeeping bias 
caused by the prioritisation of Russian official sources in its coverage of the Ukraine crisis. 
Therefore, my third hypothesis is: 
H3:  Bias in ITAR-TASS’s reporting of Ukraine is caused by high representation 
of Russian government officials in its stories. 
However, it is unlikely to find personal opinions in ITAR-TASS’s news coverage, because it 
adopts the ‘objective’ style of writing in newswires. Alternatively, I expect to find ‘corporate bias’, 
in other words, one driven by the ideological, social and political orientations of media 
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organizations (Barkho, 2013a).  This is as opposed to ‘personal bias’, which would derive from 
the educational, religious, economic or racial background of individual journalists. Therefore, my 
fourth hypothesis is the following: 
H4:  Bias in ITAR-TASS’s reporting of Ukraine is caused by its corporate views 
on Ukraine, but not by the personal views of the journalists. 
Methodology 
In the studies on news coverage of national politics in the United States, unbalanced volumes 
or tones of news stories were seen as indications of news bias, but such an approach is not 
appropriate in measuring bias in ITAR-TASS’s news reporting of the Ukraine crisis, because (1) 
there is no ground to expect ITAR-TASS to cover different sides of the conflict equally (i.e., 
Russian news agencies more likely to report the Russian government’s views sympathetically, 
even without the influence of the Russian government, because of their greater access to Russian 
sources and Russians’ psychological attachment to the country), and (2) the rapidly changing 
situation on the ground affects the tones of news reporting (i.e., a more negative tone in a story 
might be caused merely by occurrences of more inherently negative events, such as violence 
confrontations or social disruptions, not by it being negatively framed intentionally). 
In order to overcome these problems, Interfax, a Russian news agency that is independent from 
the Russian state (Boyd-Barrett, 2014), is included in the analysis as a benchmark unit. Interfax 
was founded in a radio station in Moscow independently of the government in the last days of the 
Soviet Union. Operating as a commercial enterprise, it generates a significant portion of its 
revenues from its economic news service. According to earlier studies, 85% of Interfax clients 
consisted of banks and financial enterprises, 10% insurance and audit companies and 5% 
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privatized enterprise; it has developed a wide range of products that include providing electronic 
financial information and analytical reports, and has become a leading supplier of information on 
Russia and CIS countries. Thanks to its successful commercial operation, Interfax maintains a high 
level of independence from the Russian government (Boyd-Barrett, 2012; Rantanen & Boyd-
Barrett, 2004; Vartanova & Frolova, 2010).  
I can identify bias caused by the Russian government’s influence (‘state-ownership effect’), 
while excluding the effect of ITAR-TASS being based in Russia (‘home-country effect’) by using 
Interfax as a benchmark unit. This benchmarking also allows us to control for inherently negative 
or positive events that affect news content of ITAR-TASS (‘real-event effect’). In this approach, I 
focus on changes in ITAR-TASS’s news coverage relative to Interfax’s corresponding coverage, 
and relative changes after pivotal events are treated as bias caused by the influence of the Russian 
government. This is an application of the difference-in-differences technique, which is widely used 
in econometrics to estimate the impact of policy interventions (c.f. Card & Krueger, 1994), 
although it is much more limited for the a number of reasons. First, I cannot assume a high stability 
in benchmark units (media outlets) in studies of media since the spread of information is much less 
restricted than it is in policy interventions. Second, I often cannot find multiple benchmark units 
on which to base my statistical estimation of the uncertainty of observed news bias: this is because 
there are few media outlets comparable to those in which I am interested. Third, the occurrence of 
media bias can proceed pivotal events when they are predictable (staged events). However, unlike 
other social scientists, who only have access to numeric data, I can scrutinize original texts 
produced by the news media, and supplement the quantitative data with rich textual information 
to overcome the limitations. 
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Pivotal Events 
In the early days of the crisis, there were events with which I can relatively easily associate 
Russia’s political interests, but, as soon as the fight between Kiev’s military forces and separatists 
began, the Russian regime’s wishes became increasingly obscure. Therefore, I restricted my 
analysis to the period from January 1, 2013 to April 21, 2014, the day before the Kiev government 
relaunched its anti-separatist operations. Table 1 presents pivotal events in the Ukraine crisis with 
their desirability to the Russian regime.4 
Table 1: Pivotal events in the early stage of the Ukraine crisis 
Date Label Event Desirability 
September 03, 2013 E1 Yanukovich demands legal reforms to MPs for EU association plan  Negative 
November 21, 2013 E2 The trade agreement with the EU is abandoned by Yanukovych Positive 
January 16, 2014 E3 Protest against the pro-Russian regime in Kiev intensifies Negative 
February 22, 2014 E4 Yanukovych is removed from presidency by the parliament Negative 
March 16, 2014 E5 Crimea referendum is held and 95% support accession Positive 
April 15, 2014 E6 Military operations against separatists are launched  Negative 
 
Data Collection 
For my content analysis, I downloaded the English-language news stories covering Russia and 
CIS countries published by ITAR-TASS and Interfax respectively from the Nexis and Integrum 
databases between 2013 and 2014.5 I collected 103,236 stories for Interfax and 87,725 for ITAR-
TASS, after removing duplications. I also downloaded 21,718 Reuters reports from the Factiva on 
                                                        
4 See Appendix 1 (available at https://1drv.ms/w/s!AnEkIea2cHXz_DyTqh23A719azme) for more detailed timeline 
of the crisis. 
5 The sources were the World service wire of ITAR-TASS; CIS and Russia General Newswires and Kazakhstan, 
Belarus, Ukraine and Asia Newswires of Interfax.   
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Ukraine, but they were used solely for manual reading and dictionary construction, as explained 
in Appendix 2. 
Content Analysis 
 To perform a statistical analysis of news reporting by the news agencies, I content analysed 
the downloaded news stories in terms of their geographical focus and positive-negative framing of 
the state of democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine. Both geographical classification and framing 
analysis were accomplished by employing computerized content analysis, which relies on 
dictionaries constructed by lexicon expansion techniques (c.f. Pang & Lee, 2008; Turney & 
Littman, 2003). The geographical dictionary comprises not only names of places but also of 
institutions and persons related to the crisis for a higher classification accuracy. The framing 
dictionaries contain words related to democracy and sovereignty and scored in terms of their 
positive-negative sentiments. Construction of these dictionaries was based on statistical analysis 
of the corpus of news stories that I downloaded to avoid arbitrary choices of words. 
The adoption of computerized techniques is not only for efficiency in analysing the large 
volume of news stories published over 16 months, but also for consistency, which is usually 
difficult for human coders to achieve. The geographical classifier removed almost all the news 
articles not about Ukraine, accomplishing 0.94 in precision and 0.83 in recall. The framing analysis 
could replicate human judgements, achieving strong correlation between machine and human 
coding both in democracy (r=0.77) and sovereignty (r=0.70) (see Appendix 2 for details 
explanation and validation of the computerized method). 
Statistical Model 
To estimate news bias in ITAR-TASS’s news reporting, the continuous sentiment scores were 
regressed on indicators for time period following the pivotal events (𝑒𝑒1 … 𝑒𝑒6), a dummy variable 
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for ITAR-TASS (𝑔𝑔), and their interactions (𝑒𝑒1𝑔𝑔… 𝑒𝑒6𝑔𝑔) with a random intercept (𝑢𝑢) clustered by 
day:  
𝑌𝑌 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑒𝑒1 …𝛽𝛽6𝑒𝑒6 + 𝛿𝛿𝑔𝑔 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑒𝑒1𝑔𝑔… 𝛾𝛾6𝑒𝑒6𝑔𝑔 + 𝑢𝑢 + 𝜀𝜀 
The inclusion of random intercept is to accurately estimate differences between ITAR-TASS 
and Interfax by controlling for variance caused by time-dependent heterogeneity. In this model, 𝛿𝛿 
captures time-independent institutional heterogeneity, 𝑒𝑒1 … 𝑒𝑒6  are real-event effects, and the 
coefficients 𝛾𝛾1 … 𝛾𝛾6 are Russian government-ownership effects, in which I am most interested. 
Analysis 
The data produced by my content analysis is visualized in Figures 1 and 2, where red circles 
represent sentiment scores of individual ITAR-TASS news articles, and black and red curves 
respectively show average sentiment scores of news articles published by Interfax and ITAR-
TASS. The average sentiment scores are interpreted as representing the positive-negative framing 
of democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine by the Russian agencies at particular points of time 
during the crisis. 
In Figure 1, the red curve runs higher than and parallel to the black line before E1 showing that 
the framing of Ukraine’s democracy was normally more positive by ITAR-TASS than by Interfax. 
However, ITAR-TASS’s coverage shifts toward negative after E1, when the president called for 
legal reforms to join the EU, but it returns to the normal level of positivity relative to Interfax over 
E2-E3, following the abandonment of the trade agreement with the EU. A sharp negative shift 
occurs after E3, and its framing becomes almost as negative as Interfax’s over E4-E5. Finally, its 
framing moves sharply negative after E5, reaching peak negativity around E6, coinciding with the 
launch of the anti-separatist operation by the Kiev government. 
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Figure 1: Framing of democracy 
 
In Figure 2, the difference in the framing of sovereignty between ITAR-TASS and Interfax 
over E1-E2 remains approximately the same as the pre-E1 period. A negative shift of framing 
starts only after E2, and the relatively positive framing by ITAR-TASS disappears in E3-E4, when 
the anti-government protests intensify in Kiev. Nevertheless, its framing rapidly improves from 
E4 toward E5 when the Crimean referendum was held, but it, again, becomes as negative as 
Interfax after E6. 
Figure 2: Framing of sovereignty 
 
MEASURING NEWS BIAS 16 
 
Amount of bias 
The amount of bias in the framing of the Ukraine crisis by ITAR-TASS was estimated using 
the statistical model, the results being presented in Table 2. In the table, the most important 
coefficients are found next to the interactions between the time indicators (E1-6) and the dummy 
variable for ITAR-TASS (TASS), which measures effects of Russian government’s ownership. 
The estimated state-ownership bias is also summarized in Figure 3 with 95% confidence intervals. 
Table 2: Framing of the Ukraine crisis by ITAR-TASS 
 
 Dependent variable:   
 Democracy Sovereignty 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
TASS 31.033*** 22.735*** 22.416*** 34.783*** 27.411*** 27.231*** 
 (6.953) (6.946) (6.943) (9.695) (9.954) (9.910) 
E1 14.575** 17.458*** 17.663*** 16.757* 20.562** 20.538** 
 (6.655) (6.525) (6.517) (8.916) (8.949) (8.874) 
E2 -42.680*** -40.624*** -40.111*** -19.738** -19.243** -18.363** 
 (6.007) (5.920) (5.913) (7.990) (8.012) (7.928) 
E3 -45.593*** -45.494*** -44.906*** -27.975*** -30.279*** -29.495*** 
 (5.883) (5.828) (5.821) (8.108) (8.149) (8.053) 
E4 -24.071*** -16.678** -15.750** -4.876 -2.373 -0.714 
 (6.628) (6.560) (6.554) (8.844) (8.895) (8.780) 
E5 -17.029*** -7.679 -7.175 -16.221* -10.020 -10.128 
 (6.492) (6.467) (6.458) (8.511) (8.624) (8.518) 
E6 -27.771** -15.346 -14.695 -19.681 -12.285 -11.271 
 (11.119) (11.047) (11.027) (14.534) (14.658) (14.460) 
Russia  -23.663*** -23.481***  -18.714*** -18.516*** 
  (3.052) (3.050)  (3.757) (3.741) 
Quote  -70.038*** -34.341***  -2.375 89.584*** 
  (4.066) (12.456)  (5.204) (16.076) 
Quote^2   -41.860***   -105.207*** 
   (13.807)   (17.413) 
TASS:E1 -31.737** -31.808*** -31.787*** -27.482 -30.023 -31.778* 
 (12.422) (12.110) (12.102) (18.747) (18.768) (18.688) 
TASS:E2 -1.067 -0.390 0.172 -16.277 -15.150 -14.970 
 (9.320) (9.085) (9.081) (12.990) (12.987) (12.930) 
TASS:E3 -16.794* -17.785** -17.681** -32.245*** -30.403** -30.872** 
 (8.741) (8.522) (8.517) (12.456) (12.434) (12.381) 
TASS:E4 -29.571*** -34.481*** -34.003*** -24.722** -25.576** -25.141** 
 (8.744) (8.594) (8.590) (11.887) (11.987) (11.937) 
TASS:E5 -38.267*** -41.076*** -39.884*** -14.107 -17.361 -15.024 
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 (9.185) (9.205) (9.208) (12.094) (12.454) (12.408) 
TASS:E6 -52.389*** -54.172*** -53.512*** -48.739*** -53.991*** -52.927*** 
 (13.013) (12.887) (12.881) (16.583) (16.825) (16.757) 
TASS:Russia  10.958** 10.944**  13.335* 14.804** 
  (5.118) (5.115)  (7.048) (7.024) 
Constant 8.998*** 48.364*** 43.364*** 12.560*** 22.348*** 9.795* 
 (3.264) (3.840) (4.176) (4.426) (5.205) (5.572)  
Observations 6,723 6,723 6,723 4,180 4,180 4,180 
Log Likelihood -40,066.280 -39,871.670 -39,863.540 -24,936.590 -24,916.190 -24,894.250 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 80,164.550 79,781.340 79,767.070 49,905.170 49,870.380 49,828.500 
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 80,273.530 79,910.750 79,903.280 50,006.530 49,990.730 49,955.180  
Note: *p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01 
 
Figure 3: Estimated state-ownership effect 
 
As summarized in Figure 3, ITAR-TASS’s coverage of democracy in Ukraine becomes 
statistically significantly more negative (-31.7, p<0.05) than during pre-crisis after Yanukovych’s 
speech (E1), indicating the Russian government’s  influence on ITAR-TASS. Its framing of 
Ukraine then becomes as positive as the pre-crisis period after the abandonment of negotiation 
(E2). The change following the intensified anti-regime protest (E3) is only marginal (-16.7, 
p=0.054), but the collapse of the regime (E4) (-29.5, p<0.01) and Crimea referendum (E5) (-38.2, 
p<0.01) are strongly significant. The framing of democracy in Ukraine becomes increasingly 
negative, reaching -52.3 points (p<0.01) after the start of anti-separatist military operations (E6). 
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This result clearly shows that all the events, other than E5, are followed by changes in framing 
toward the same direction as predicted by their desirability for the Russia regime.  
ITAR-TASS’s framing of sovereignty becomes significantly negative (-32.2, p<0.01) only 
after anti-regime protests intensify (E3), because earlier events did not have serious implications 
for Ukraine’s sovereignly. Framing starts shifting toward the positive (-24.7, p<0.05) from the 
collapse of the regime (E4), and then negativity completely disappears (p=0.21) after the Crimea 
referendum (E5), but Kiev’s military operations against pro-Russian separatists (E6) brings it to 
the most negative level (-48,7, p<0.01). These changes also match the patterns, that the author 
expected based on the desirability of events for the Russian government.6 
Source of Bias 
The statements of Russian officials frequently quoted in ITAR-TASS’s news articles are one 
of the main sources of bias. In my statistical analysis, a dummy variable for mentions of Russian 
entities (Russia in Table 2) created from the secondary-country category by the geographical 
classifier shows that articles mentioning Russian entities are 23.6 points (p<0.01) more negative 
about the democracy in Ukraine, and higher proportions of quotes in articles (Quote in Table 2) 
lead to more negative framing of the country (β=-70.0, p<0.01). The effect of mentions of Russian 
entities also appeared to be statistically significantly negative (β=-18.7, p<0.01) on framing of 
sovereignty (model 5), but proportions of quotations have no significant effects in this subject 
(p=0.64). Yet, further exploration of the data revealed that quadratic terms of the proportions 
                                                        
6 Confirmation of the statistical findings by manual reading of the news stories is presented in Appendix 4 (available 
at https://1drv.ms/w/s!AnEkIea2cHXz_DyTqh23A719azme). 
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(Quote^2) have very strongly significant effects in both democracy (β=-41.8, p<0.01 in model 3) 
and sovereignty (β=-105.2, p<0.01 in model 6). 
Figure 4: Non-linear relationship between sentiment and quotes 
 
Figure 4 presents sentiment scores predicted by the model 3 and 6 for news articles which 
mentioned Russian entities and were published by ITAR-TASS after E6. These articles clearly 
show a non-linear association between framing scores and proportions of quotations, which 
suggests that there are, at least, three types of biased news stories. The first type simply describes 
situations regarding democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine negatively with little or no quotation 
of sources (less than 30% of wordage), while the second largely relies on negative comments on 
Ukraine made by Russian officials or pro-Russian Ukraine leaders (more than 70%). In the third 
type, relatively positive comments on Ukraine made by foreign actors, who are important in stories 
on sovereignty, are quoted (30-70%), but these are followed by very negative descriptions of the 
situation in the country, which are barely relevant to the quotes, to make the overall framing in the 
news articles more negative (examples of these three types are presented in Appendix 5). 
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Discussion 
In my analysis of the framing of democracy and sovereignty in Ukraine by ITAR-TASS’s 
English-language service, I found that the news agency’s framing reflected the desirability of the 
preceding events for the Russian government, i.e., only the abandonment of the trade agreement 
with the EU and the Crimean referendum were framed in as positive a manner as news on Ukraine 
had been in the pre-crisis period. Apart from the periods following these two events, framing of 
the Ukraine crisis was profoundly negative, the most negative framing appearing after the launch 
of military operations against pro-Russian separatists. In this period, ITAR-TASS’s framing of 
democracy and sovereignty shifted 1.88 and 2.47 times greater than Interfax’s framing toward the 
negative, whereby I estimated the amount of bias in ITAR-TASS’s coverage to be as large as -
52.3 points regarding democracy and -48.7 points regarding sovereignty. These findings support 
my first and second hypotheses (H1 and H2), and thus I argue that ITAR-TASS’s news coverage 
of Ukraine was biased, reflecting the interests of the Russian governmentin the country. 
The strategic coverage of the Ukraine crisis by ITAR-TASS is indicative of the importance of 
the news agency in Russia’s ‘hybrid wars’, which utilizes non-military means to attain military 
goals. In recent years, researchers have paid special attention to Russia’s satellite news channel, 
Russia Today (RT), as a medium for public diplomacy (Galeotti, 2015; Nelson, Orttung, & 
Livshen, 2015), but very few studies on ITAR-TASS have been conducted from this perspective. 
The findings of this research suggest that the soft power strategy of Russia, which has been 
advanced by Vladimir Putin since 2012 (Light, 2015), is more comprehensive than previously 
thought, namely, in addition to the dissemination of news stories directly to foreign audiences via 
RT, the Russian government utilizes ITAR-TASS to reach foreign news media, bypassing the 
Western media’s foreign correspondents in Moscow, who tend to be negative about the regime 
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(Evans, 2005). To achieve this goal, ITAR-TASS even mixes its own very negative descriptions 
on Ukraine with positive comments of Western leaders, who are generally more newsworthy than 
Russian officials for Western audiences, in its news coverage, creating the non-linear relationship 
between the sentiment scores and the numbers of quotation. This is a sophisticated propaganda 
technique to increase the chance of its news stories to be accepted and redistributed by foreign 
news media. 
By scrutinizing the three types of biased news stories, I have discovered that the main sources 
of bias in ITAR-TASS’s coverage of Ukraine were (1) statements of Russian officials, to which 
the Russian news agency grants higher prominence, and (2) negative descriptions of the situation 
in Ukraine, supporting my third and fourth hypotheses (H3 and H4). These causes are to a large 
extent consistent with the typology developed by D’Alessio and Allen (2000), but not entirely so, 
because ITAR-TASS’s news articles are written in an ‘objective’ style without making clear 
distinction between opinions and facts as required in Western journalism. In other words, the 
typology of news bias developed in research on the Western media does not fully apply to the non-
Western media, in which opinions are disguised as facts. 
Based on the findings, I propose three changes in its definitions of news bias to extend the 
scope of the typology. First, D’Alessio and Allen have defined statement bias as a result of 
inclusion of journalists’ opinions, but it should not be restricted to direct expression of opinions 
(e.g., expressly support or criticize actors or ideas), because opinions can be blended into news 
stories in various forms, some of which are very difficult to distinguish from ‘objective’ 
description of events or issues. In fact, much of the bias in ITAR-TASS’s news stories on Ukraine 
was caused by descriptions with excessive emphasis on their negative aspects of events. Second, 
as Barkho (2013a) pointed out that sources of bias are not only backgrounds of individual 
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journalists (personal bias) but also ideological, social and political orientations of media 
organizations (corporate bias), statement bias should encompass insertion of opinions of media 
organizations as well as of individual journalists, because personal  opinions of journalists were 
not found in ITAR-TASS’s news stories at all. Third, gatekeeping bias was very broadly defined 
as it is caused by selection or deselection of particular kinds of stories, but it should be redefined 
as bias caused by prioritization of particular sources, since quotation of news sources is the most 
significant source of bias, which can be easily distinguished from statement bias. These proposed 
definitions of news bias are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3: Types and definitions of news bias 
Type Cause Structure Example Measurement 
Statement bias Insertion of opinions of journalists 
or media organizations 
No quote Stories emphasising 
social disruption caused 
by pro-EU protesters  
Positive-negative 
framing of events, 
issues or actors in 
relation to 
benchmark units 
Description of events or issues 
with focus on particular aspects 





Stories quoting Russian 





Finally, the revelation of the systematic bias in ITAR-TASS’s news coverage of Ukraine 
demonstrates that the new methodology is an effective approach to measuring news bias. Although 
I have focused on ITAR-TASS in this research, the new approach is not limited to studies of news 
agencies or international news media: It is particularly useful in research on media bias in countries 
with a multi-party or authoritative political system, where estimation of news bias has been very 
difficult due to the lack of non-media benchmarks. In research on the news bias in multi-party 
political systems, one can choose a news organization with a particular characteristic (e.g., 
ownership, political affiliation, etc.) that is expected to cause bias in its news content. Then, the 
news content should be compared with news content produced by other news organizations lacking 
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that characteristic. Even if partisan journalism is widely practiced, inclusion of multiple 
benchmark units selected from the entire political spectrum should allow estimation of news bias. 
Authoritative media systems usually have very few independent or anti-regime media outlets, but 
comparison between the state-controlled media should show relative sizes of news bias 
correspondingly to media outlets’ susceptivity to the media control as I have shown elsewhere 
(Lankina & Watanabe, Forthcoming). I invite readers to research on objectivity of news in some 
of the most problematic media systems, where biased news reporting is the pressing issue to 
democracy. 
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